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THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 




Despite some academic attention on the applicability of the law of international 
responsibility to international humanitarian law (IHL) violations,1 scant attention has 
been devoted to the influence of IHL on the development of the law of international 
responsibility. This essay explores this field, and in particular the development of rules 
related to breaches of obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes. This 
analysis focuses on the rules protecting civilians and persons hors de combat (so-called 
‘Geneva law’) applicable to international armed conflicts. It argues that, since the 
aftermath of the Second World War, IHL has provided for some specific consequences 
regarding serious violations that may be seen as a precursor to the current law of state 
responsibility regarding obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes,2 as 
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Cawthorne, Kubo Mačák, Maria Irene Papa, and Marco Roscini for their comments on previous drafts, and 
the participants to the Expert Roundtable on the Impact of the Law of Armed Conflict on General 
International Law, University of Exeter, 22-23 September 2016 for their remarks on my presentation on 
this topic. The usual disclaimers apply. Internet references were last accessed on 30 May 2018 when the 
paper was completed.
1 See, e.g., Pierre d’Argent, Les réparations de guerre en droit international public: la responsabilité 
internationale des États à l’épreuve de la guerre (Bruylant/LGDJ 2002); Marco Sassòli, ‘State 
Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (2002) 84 IRRC 401.
2 On the concept of obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes generally, see Paolo Picone, ‘Obblighi 
reciproci ed obblighi erga omnes degli Stati nel campo della protezione internazionale dell’ambiente 
marino dall’inquinamento’ in Vincenzo Starace (ed), Diritto internazionale e protezione dell’ambiente 
marino (Giuffrè 1983) 15 (reprinted, along with other contributions on this topic by the same author, in 
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developed by the International Law Commission (ILC) for many decades and finalised in 
the authoritative – albeit non-binding – 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
(DARS).3 Since the four 1949 Geneva Conventions4 have been ratified by every state in 
the world, so that it is difficult to separate the treaty obligations (some of which are 
considered obligations erga omnes partes) from the corresponding customary obligations 
(some of which are considered obligations erga omnes) for the purposes of this study,5 
this author will refer simultaneously to the 1949 Geneva Conventions qua treaties and to 
the corresponding rules of customary international law. With regard to the 1977 First 
Additional Protocol (API), only its provisions reflecting customary international law may 
be seen as embodying obligations erga omnes, while some of its treaty provisions may 
be seen as examples of obligations erga omnes partes.6
The article opens with a brief overview of the concepts of obligations erga omnes and 
erga omnes partes (section II), and goes on to demonstrate that IHL comprises obligations 
erga omnes and erga omnes partes (section III). The article then demonstrates that the 
reactions to serious violations of obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes 
Paolo Picone, Comunità internazionale e obblighi erga omnes (3rd edn, Jovene 2013) 1); Maurizio Ragazzi, 
The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (OUP 1997); Christian J Tams, Enforcing 
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (CUP 2005); Giorgio Gaja, ‘The Protection of General 
Interests in the International Community’ [2012] 364 RCADI 9.
3 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries [2001] 
ILCY vol II, Part Two 31 (DARS).
4 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
(Second Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 13; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 287.
5 On the differences between the regimes pertaining to obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes 
partes, see Maria Irene Papa, ‘Interesse ad agire davanti alla Corte internazionale di giustizia e tutela dei 
valori collettivi nella sentenza sul caso Belgio c Senegal’ (2013) 7 Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 79, 
86-95; Paolo Picone, ‘La responsabilità degli Stati tra codificazione e sviluppo progressivo della materia’ 
(2016) 99 Rivista di diritto internazionale (RDI) 751, 756-758.
6 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3.
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envisaged by the DARS already existed with regard to serious IHL violations (section 
IV).
II. Obligations Erga Omnes and Obligations Erga Omnes Partes
In 1970, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) introduced the concept of obligations 
erga omnes in the international law debate for the first time. 7 According to a very famous 
dictum:
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis 
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the 
former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they 
are obligations erga omnes.8
  
Accordingly, obligations erga omnes are those international customary obligations that 
are the concern of every state since they are owed towards the international community 
as a whole, rather than towards one or more states.9 Similarly, obligations erga omnes 
partes (sometimes called erga omnes contractantes) are those treaty obligations owed 
towards a group of states parties to the same treaty, which all have a legal interest in 
7 The ICJ did not create obligations erga omnes, but rather, some regional treaties protecting minorities 
between the First World War and the Second World War alluded to the concept of community interests, as 
partially noted in some individual opinions of judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice (see 
Tarcisio Gazzini, ‘The Protection of Minorities at the Origins of the Notion of Erga Omnes Obligations’ in 
Andreas R Ziegler, Julie Kuffer (eds), Les Minorités et le Droit — Minorities and the Law (Schulthess 
2016) 13).
8 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Second Phase Judgment) [1970] ICJ Reports, 
para 33. On the legacy of this dictum, see See Christian J Tams and Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Barcelona 
Traction at 40: The ICJ as an Agent of Legal Development’ (2010) 23 LJIL 781.
9 See ICTY, Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, para 151; Institut de Droit 
international, Krakow session, Resolution of 27 August 2005, Article 1. 
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respecting the rules embodied therein.10 The core element of these kinds of obligations is 
the fact that the legal interest in their compliance is common to and shared between a 
number of states or every state in the international community.11 Accordingly, they are a 
manifestation of the shift of the international community from bilateral and multilateral 
relations towards common concerns and interests.12 Obligations erga omnes are also 
partially different from jus cogens: though every jus cogens norm produces obligations 
erga omnes, not every obligation erga omnes is a jus cogens norm. In brief, peremptory 
law concerns hierarchy between rules, while the notion of obligations erga omnes focuses 
on the holders of the corresponding legal interests.13
The ILC has explored the role of obligations erga omnes from the perspective of state 
responsibility since 1976, when the Special Rapporteur Roberto Ago supported the 
adoption of Draft Article 19 addressing the so-called international crimes of states, which 
were implicitly based on serious violations of obligations erga omnes.14 This provision 
10 For more on the classification of international obligations, see Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, ‘The 
Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International 
Responsibility’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1127; Joost Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are 
WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’ (2003) 14 EJIL 907, 909-925.
11 Legal scholarship is divided between those who believe that the implementation of obligations erga 
omnes partes by individual states is linked to a process of hierarchisation of the international community, 
and those who consider that individual states may implement obligations erga omnes in the framework of 
a decentralised international community. For an overview of this debate, see Bonafé, The Relationship 
Between State and Individual Responsibility for International Crimes (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 23-24, fn 
37; Alessandra Gianelli, ‘Il contributo della dottrina italiana al tema della responsibilità internazionale degli 
Stati per fatto illecito: qualche osservazione’ (2016) 99 RDI 1042, 1055-1056. 
12 On this topic, see eg Bruno Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ 
[1994-VI] 250 RCADI 217.
13 See DARS, Commentaries to Chapter III, para 7. Previously, this distinction has been emphasised by 
José B Acosta Estévez, ‘Normas de ius cogens, efecto erga omnes, crimen internacional y la teoría de los 
círculos concéntricos’ (1995) 11 Anuario de derecho internacional 3, 12-15; Simma (n 12) 300; Denis 
Alland, ‘Countermeasures of General Interest’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1221, 1237. For more on this, see Paolo 
Picone, ‘The Distinction between Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes’ in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed), The 
Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (OUP 2011) 411. 
14 See ‘Report of the International Law Commission on Its 28th Session’ [1976-II] YILC 75. The same 
report goes on to affirm that ‘The criterion formulated in paragraph 2 of article 19 has two aspects. One is 
the requirement that the obligation breached shall, by virtue of its content, be essential for the protection of 
fundamental interests of the international community; the other, which complements the first and provides 
a guarantee that is essential in such a delicate matter, makes the international community as a whole 
5
was intended to be the basis of an aggravated regime of international responsibility for 
the commission of international crimes of state — an issue that triggered a significant 
scholarly debate.15 In 2001, the new Special Rapporteur, James Crawford, abolished the 
distinction between international crimes and delicts, and based the aggravated regime on 
serious violations of jus cogens.16 However, obligations erga omnes did not disappear 
from the ILC’s articles, but rather, they, along with obligations erga omnes partes, are 
implicitly mentioned in Articles 42(b) and 48(1) DARS.17 Article 42(b) considers that 
states ‘specially affected’ by violations of obligations ‘owed to […] a group of states 
including that state [obligations erga omnes partes], or the international community as a 
whole [obligations erga omnes]’ are injured state under the law of international 
responsible for judging whether the obligation is essential and, accordingly, whether its breach is of a 
“criminal” nature’ (ibid, 119). This appears to be the definition of obligations erga omnes pursuant to the 
Barcelona Traction case, which is mentioned by the same report as one of the most relevant judgments 
regarding international crimes (ibid, at 99). The same report rejects the equation between jus cogens 
violations and international crimes (‘It would be wrong simply to conclude that any breach of an obligation 
deriving from a peremptory norm of international law is an international crime and that only the breach of 
an obligation having this origin can constitute such a crime’, ibid, 119-120). The conclusion that 
international crimes of states are based on violations of obligations erga omnes is also based on the fact 
that the additional consequences of these violations, which are addressed subsequently in this section,  
affect every state in the international community; accordingly, if every state is affected at the level of 
secondary rules (ie rules on state responsibility) by the breach of these obligations, at the level of primary 
rules, the obligations at the basis of international crimes must be relevant not only for individual states, but 
rather, for every state in the international community as well (as affirmed by Picone, ‘Obblighi’ (n 2) 49-
53). This conclusion is supported by the special rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz, who affirmed that the 
Commission considered that ‘[a] crime justifies the adoption of countermeasures […] not only on the part 
of the State, if any, primarily injured by the breach, but also of any other State in any way injured by the 
wrongful act’ (‘Fifth report on State responsibility, by Mr Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Special Rapporteur’ 
[1993-II] YILC para 127).
15 See, e.g., Joseph HH Weiler, Antonio Cassese, Marina Spinedi (eds), International Crimes of State: A 
Critical Analysis of the ILC’S Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (de Gruyter 1989); André de Hoogh, 
Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes (Kluwer Law International 1996); Georges Abi-Saab, 
‘The Uses of Article 19’ (1999) 10 EJIL 339. 
16 See Chapter III of Part 2 DARS and the accompanying commentary. See also James Crawford, State 
Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013) 390-394.
17 On the ongoing relevance of obligations erga omnes in the DARS, see Paolo Picone, ‘Obblighi erga 
omnes e codificazione della responsabilità degli Stati’ (2005) 88 RDI 893; Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, 
‘L’influence des droits de l’homme sur la structure du droit international, deuxième partie: Les 
conséquences structurelles de la hiérarchisation’ (2012) 116 RGDIP 242, 245-251.
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responsibility. Article 48(1) DARS, in line with previous case law,18 addresses the right 
of any state that cannot be qualified as injured under Article 42 DARS, in relation 
violations of obligations ‘owed to a group of states including that state, and […] 
established for the protection of a collective interest of the group’ (obligations erga omnes 
partes), and obligations ‘owed to the international community as a whole’ (obligations 
erga omnes); these states, which may be identified as ‘indirectly affected states’,19  may 
invoke the responsibility of another state, and may claim cessation of the wrongful act 
and assurances of non-repetition, as well as performance of the obligation of reparation 
on behalf of the injured state or the beneficiaries of the violated obligation.20 
It is still unclear whether obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes 
allow indirectly affected states to adopt countermeasures in cases of serious violations. 
The ILC acknowledged the existence of certain state practice, but considered it to be 
sparse and limited.21 Consequently, Article 54 DARS only affirms that indirectly affected 
states may adopt ‘lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach and 
reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation 
breached’, without clarifying the meaning of ‘lawful measures’. It has been suggested 
that this expression refers to countermeasures that are admissible under customary 
international law, so that the adjective ‘lawful’ would not refer to acts per se lawful, but 
rather, to measures that would be unlawful except for the fact that they are adopted as 
countermeasures; the opposite interpretation, according to which Article 54 refers only to 
acts that are per se legal, would render the provision superfluous because it would only 
restate the proposition that international law allows states to engage in non-prohibited 
18 See ICTY (n 9) para 151.
19 The expression ‘indirectly affected states’ is used instead of ‘non-injured states’ when referring to 
obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes because, under their very definitions, every state 
in the international community or every state party to certain treaties is injured in case of violations of these 
kinds of obligations. Accordingly, the DARS terminology appears inaccurate.
20 See Art 48 DARS, and the accompanying commentaries; Institut de Droit international (n 9) Articles 2 
and 5(a). 
21 DARS, Commentary to Art 54, paras 3-7.
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actions.22 Consequently, state practice and opinio juris must be analysed in order to verify 
whether such countermeasures are permissible. According to a number of scholars, there 
is sufficient uniform state practice to affirm that peaceful countermeasures may be 
adopted by indirectly affected states,23 while the possibility of using force as a 
countermeasure against violations of obligations erga omnes is more uncertain: although 
this solution has been considered lawful in certain specific circumstances by some 
scholars,24 and is debated in relation to the use of force under the doctrine of the 
Responsibility to Protect,25 the ban on the use of force beyond the limited exceptions 
within the UN Charter is still considered to be a cornerstone of contemporary 
international law.26 Accordingly, forcible countermeasures are generally considered 
unlawful.27
22 See Picone, ‘Obblighi erga omnes e codificazione’ (n 17) 940; Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, 
‘Countermeasures in Response to Grave Violations of Obligations Owed to the International Community’ 
in James Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 
1137, 1144-1148.
23 See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Observations sur la pratique récente des “sanctions” de l’illicite’ (1983) 87 
RGDIP 505; Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, Les réactions décentralisées à l’illicite: des contre-mesures à la 
légitime défense (LGDJ 1990) 155-174; Jochen A Frowein, ‘Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to 
Breaches of Public International Law’ [1994-IV] 248 RCADI 345, 405-422; Tams (n 2) 207-249; Elena 
Katselli Proukaki, The Problem of Enforcement in International Law: Countermeasures, the Non-injured 
State and the Idea of International Community (Routledge 2009) 90-209; Martin Dawidowicz, Third-Party 
Countermeasures in International Law (CUP 2017). See also Institut de Droit international (n 9) Article 
5(c).
24 See Antonio Cassese, ‘Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? (1999) 10 EJIL 23, 29; Paolo Picone, 
‘La “guerra del Kosovo” e il diritto internazionale generale’ (2000) 83 RDI 309; Id, ’Unilateralismo e 
guerra contro l’ISIS’ (2015) 98 RDI 5.
25 See Paolo Picone, ‘Recensione a: Christopher Verlage, Responsibility to Protect (Mohr Siebeck 2009)’ 
93 RDI 287; Marco Longobardo, ‘Genocide, Obligations Erga Omnes, and the Responsibility to Protect: 
Remarks on a Complex Convergence’ (2015) 19 IJHR 1199; Francesco Francioni, ‘Responsibility to 
Protect in the Age of Global Terror: A Methodological Reassessment’ (2016) 51 The International 
Spectator 19. 
26 See generally James Crawford, Rowan Nicholson, ‘The Continued Relevance of Traditional Rules and 
Institutions Relating to the Use of Force’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force 
in International Law (OUP 2015) 86.
27 See eg Art 50(1)(a) DARS. See also Frowein (n 23) 414; Christian J Tams, ‘Individual States as 
Guardians of Community Interests’ in Ulrich Fastenrath et al (eds), From Bilateralism to Community 
Interests. Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (OUP 2011) 379, 388.
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Article 41 DARS pertains to obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes as well, 
even if a superficial reading of DARS may be misleading because Article 40 DARS refers 
to jus cogens. However, until 2000, all the Special Rapporteurs after Roberto Ago had 
considered obligations erga omnes to be relevant for the aggravated regime of 
international responsibility;28 this idea is so rooted in international law that the ICJ in its 
Israeli Wall advisory opinion applied Article 41(2) DARS on the basis of the existence 
of serious violations of obligations erga omnes (including some IHL rules), affirming that 
every state is under a duty not to recognise the situation created by the construction of the 
Israeli wall.29 Accordingly, Article 41 DARS may also be seen as codifying certain 
consequences of serious violations of obligations erga omnes as well.
In recent years, the concept of obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes 
partes and the rules pertaining to the consequences of their violations have been applied 
a number of occasions before international courts. Apart from the aforementioned 2004 
ICJ’s advisory opinion, which considered that the wall built by Israel in the OPT violates 
certain obligations erga omnes (some IHL rules and the principle of self-determination 
of peoples),30 in 2006, the ICJ, recalling its own past case law,31 considered the duties to 
prevent and punish genocide to be obligations erga omnes.32 Similarly, in 2007, the Court 
28 See Part II.
29 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) [2004] ICJ Reports, para 159. Although the ICJ’s reference to ‘intransgressible principles of 
international customary law’ might be an allusion to jus cogens, clearly the ICJ focuses on obligations erga 
omnes (see Wall opinion (n 29), para 157). It is unclear whether the Court deliberately emphasised the role 
of obligations erga omnes with regard to the aggravated regime of state responsibility in opposition to the 
ILC’s perspective centred on serious violations of jus cogens (see Andrea Bianchi, ‘Dismantling the Wall: 
The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion and Its Likely Impact on International Law’ [2004] 47 GYIL 343, 380-383), 
or whether the Court simply manifested its famous reluctance to employ the concept of jus cogens (Marco 
Pertile, ‘“Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”: A 
Missed Opportunity for International Humanitarian Law?’ (2004) 14 Italian YIL 121, 155). 
30 Wall opinion (n 29), paras 155-160. 
31 Reservations to the Genocide Convention (Advisory Opinion) [1951] ICJ Reports, 23; Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia 
and Montenegro) (Judgment) [1996] ICJ Reports, para 31. 
32 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (DRC v Rwanda) (Judgment) 
[2006] ICJ Reports, para 64. This qualification was considered irrelevant in order to overcome the principle 
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implicitly recognised that the duties to prevent and punish genocide are obligations erga 
omnes,33 while in 2015 they were considered to be obligations erga omnes partes.34 
Additionally, in 2011, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea acknowledged 
that Article 137(2) UNCLOS embodies obligations erga omnes, and that, consequently, 
‘[e]ach State Party may also be entitled to claim compensation’ pursuant to Article 48 
DARS.35 Moreover, in 2012, the ICJ declared that the 1984 UN Convention against 
Torture embodies obligations erga omnes partes and that, accordingly, every contracting 
state has locus standi before an international tribunal with jurisdiction over a case 
regarding violations of such obligations.36 In addition, obligations erga omnes and 
obligations erga omnes partes played a major role in the Australian strategy in the 
Whaling case before the ICJ — even if the Court did not have an opportunity to address 
this issue since Japan had not challenged Australian locus standi.37 Finally, the Marshall 
Islands claimed locus standi on the basis of obligations erga omnes partes allegedly 
embodied in Article 6 of the 1968 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and in 
the allegedly corresponding customary obligations erga omnes.38 
of consent in the settlement of international disputes (ibid), following the opinion expressed in East Timor 
(Portugal v Australia) (Judgment) [1995] ICJ Reports, para 29.
33 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Reports, paras 147 and 185 (note that the 
Court did not challenge the qualification of obligations erga omnes provided by the applicant).
34 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v 
Serbia) (Judgment) [2015] ICJ Reports, para 87.
35 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in 
the Area (Advisory Opinion) [2011] ITLOS Reports, para 180.
36 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (Judgment) [2012] 
ICJ Reports, paras 68-70. For some remarks, see Papa (n 5) 5.
37 See Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Whaling and International Law (CUP 2015) 109-113; Christian J Tams, 
‘Roads Not Taken, Opportunities Missed: Procedural and Jurisdictional Questions Sidestepped in the 
Whaling Judgment’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Dai Tamada (eds), Whaling in the Antarctic: Significance 
and Implications of the ICJ Judgment (Brill 2016) 193, 201-211, and the references cited therein. The ICJ 
decided the case on Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening) (Judgment) 
[2014] ICJ Reports.
38 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v Pakistan) (Application instituting proceedings against Pakistan) [2014] 
ICJ Reports, paras 35–36; Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms 
Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v India) (Application instituting proceedings against 
10
On the basis of the international case law examined, it is clear that obligations erga 
omnes and obligations erga omnes partes are highly topical issues in the law of state 
responsibility. Accordingly, it is important to understand the origins of such concepts and 
of the law of state responsibility pertaining to their violations.
III. Some Indicators of Community Interests in IHL
a. Preliminary Remarks
At its origins, IHL was characterised by reciprocity. According to Article 2 of the 1907 
Hague Regulations, the rules embodied therein ‘do not apply except between Contracting 
powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention’39 (the so-called 
si omnes clause). This assumption reflected the esprit du temp, according to which the 
law of war was concerned only with the interests of the belligerents in the framework of 
bilateral relations (or series of bilateral relations if there were more than two belligerents). 
It is clear why the Hague Regulations pay scant heed to the protection of civilians, but 
rather, focus on states’ interests. 
However, with the evolution of the law of war, the protection of the civilian population 
became the cornerstone of the jus in bello, which faced a progressive process of 
humanisation.40 This process, which was marked by the adoption of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, was further developed in the 1977 API, and caused the demise of the si 
the Republic of India) [2014] Reports, paras 40–41; Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to 
Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v UK) (Application 
instituting proceedings against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) [2014] ICJ 
Reports, paras 85–86. 
39 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 205 CTS 277. See also Art 24 Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, 11 LNTS 440.
40 See, generally, Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 AJIL 239.
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omnes clause even with respect to the Hague Regulations,41 which are applicable as a 
matter of customary international law irrespective of reciprocity.42
In keeping with this trend, and as will be shown in the subsequent sections, in 
contemporary IHL, the obligations regarding the protection of certain groups are owed 
towards the international community as a whole, and every state has a legal interest in 
other states’ compliance. In other words, as shown by a brief examination of some 
relevant provisions, contemporary IHL clearly embodies obligations erga omnes and 
obligations erga omnes partes.
b. Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
According to common Article 1 of the 1959 Geneva Conventions, ‘[t]he High Contracting 
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect’ for the 1949 Geneva Conventions ‘in 
all circumstances’. This provision is restated in the API, and it is considered to be part of 
customary law.43 There has been an extensive debate regarding the meaning of the words 
‘ensure respect’; although some scholars have argued that these provisions add nothing 
to the duty to respect the Conventions and to prevent private actors from violating them,44 
it has also been asserted that they emphasise the fact that the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
embody obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes.45 Consequently, it is 
possible to identify an external dimension of common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva 
41 The si omnes clause is ruled out by common Art 2(3) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. More generally 
on the demise of reciprocity in IHL, see Mark Osiel, The End of Reciprocity (CUP 2009) 31-150. 
42 See Wall opinion (n 29) para 89. 
43 Art 1(1) API; Rule 144 in Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (CUP 2005) (Customary IHL) vol I 509-513.
44 See Carlo Focarelli, ‘Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?’ (2010) 21 
EJIL 125.
45 See Luigi Condorelli, Laurence Boisson De Chazournes: ‘Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation 
des États de «respecter et faire respecter» le droit international humanitaire «en toutes circonstances»’ in 
Christophe Swinarski (ed), Études en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (ICRC 1984) 17; and ‘Common Article 1 
of the Geneva Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests’ (2000) 82 IRRC 67.
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Conventions that shows that states have a legal interest in other states’ compliance with 
the rules embodied in the conventions beyond a strict regime of reciprocity.46 
This seems the better interpretation because of the duty to interpret in an effective way 
every provision of a treaty and in light of the significant subsequent practice regarding 
the interpretation of these provisions.47 Additionally, it is noteworthy that the words 
‘ensure respect’ were introduced through a proposal of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), which aimed at the creation of additional obligations for states 
beyond their own commitment to respect the Conventions.48 International case law 
confirms the interpretation that common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions  refers 
also to conduct in relation to other states. First, in the Wall opinion, the ICJ strengthened 
its finding regarding the consequences of Israeli violations of certain obligations erga 
omnes by invoking common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.49 Moreover, the 
ICJ invoked briefly common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions  in the Nicaragua 
case in order to spell out US duties regarding a conflict to which it was not a party, 
46 ibid. See also, among others, Jean Pictet (ed), Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (ICRC 1958) 15; Paolo Benvenuti, ‘Ensuring Observance 
of International Humanitarian Law: Function, Extent and Limits of the Obligation of Third States to Ensure 
Respect for International Humanitarian Law’ [1989-90] Yearbook of the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law 27; Knut Dörmann, Jose Serralvo, ‘Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and 
the Obligation to Prevent International Humanitarian Law Violations’ (2014) 96 IRRC 707; Robin Geiβ, 
‘The Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for the Conventions’ in Andrea Clapham, Paola Gaeta, 
Marco Sassòli (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (OUP 2015) 111; Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts, ‘Article 1: Respect and Ensure Respect’ in ICRC, Updated Commentary on the First Geneva 
Convention (CUP 2016), 35-67; Andrea Breslin, ‘A Reflection on the Legal Obligation for Third States to 
Ensure Respect for IHL’ (2017) 22 JCSL 5.
47 See Condorelli, Boisson De Chazournes, ‘Quelques’ (n 45) 18 (emphasising the role of effective 
interpretation). For the position according to which common Article 1, though not drafted with the aim to 
emphasise such general interest, evolved into such through subsequent practice, see Frits Kalshoven, ‘The 
Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit’ 
[1999] 2 YIHL 3.
48 See Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 vol II, section B, 53. For an overview 
on the travaux préparatoires, see Dörmann, Serralvo (n 46) 712-716
49 Wall opinion (n 29) paras 158-159. The link between obligations erga omnes and common Article 1 of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions is acknowledged — albeit skeptically — in the Separate Opinion of Judge 
Higgins, para 39, and, with approval, by the Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Case C-266/16, 10 
January 2018, paras. 238-239.
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emphasising that the duties to respect and to ensure respect are separate.50 Furthermore, 
Judge Simma, in his Separate Opinion in the ICJ’s 2005 DRC v. Uganda case, linked 
common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to the possibilities for every state 
party to IHL conventions to bring a claim before the ICJ,51 thus anticipating the ICJ’s 
dictum on obligations erga omnes partes in the Belgium v Senegal case.52 In addition, the 
ICTY had invoked common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to rule out 
reciprocity in IHL, referring to ‘absolute obligations […] that are unconditional’,53 just 
after having recalled that its own case law had qualified those obligations as obligations 
erga omnes.54 
c. The ‘Big Eye’ of the International Community regarding IHL Compliance
Another important feature of contemporary IHL is that there are a number of mechanisms 
to ensure compliance with its rules on the basis of international monitoring and scrutiny. 
Even if these mechanisms do not work in a satisfactory way,55 the existence of non-
belligerents’ interests in IHL compliance suggests that the structure of these obligations 
is not merely bilateral.
First, the Protecting Powers, formalised in the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners 
of War, are relevant. Pursuant to Article 2(c) API, ‘Protecting Power means a neutral or 
other State not a Party to the conflict which has been designated by a Party to the conflict 
50 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Judgment) [1986] 
ICJ Reports, para 220.
51 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) 
(Judgment) [2005] ICJ Reports, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, para 37.
52 See supra, Section II.
53 See Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreškić, IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, para 517.
54 ibid, para 23. For an analysis of this decision in light of the erga omnes character of IHL, see Luigi 
Condorelli, ‘Responsabilité étatique et responsabilité individuelle pour violations graves du droit 
international humanitaire’ in Lal Chand Vohrah et al (eds), Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays in 
International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Kluwer Law International 2003) 211.
55 See, generally, Silja Vöneky, ‘Implementation and Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law’, in 
Dieter Fleck (ed), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (3rd edn, OUP 2013), 647.
14
and accepted by the adverse Party and has agreed to carry out the functions assigned to a 
Protecting Power’ under IHL. According to common Article 8/8/8/9 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and Article 5 API, the Protecting Powers have the duty ‘to safeguard the 
interests of the Parties to the conflict’. However, the Protecting Powers are an expression 
of a general interest of the international community, rather than of interests held only by 
the belligerents. Indeed, the appointment of Protecting Powers was envisaged as a 
belligerent’s duty pursuant to Article 8/8/8/9 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 
5 API.56 The existence of such a duty is in conflict with the alleged care only for the 
interests of the belligerents: indeed, if only these were relevant, the belligerents would 
not be prevented from waiving the appointment of Protecting Powers, but rather, they 
would be allowed to renounce the performance of some functions in only their own 
interest by mutual consent. On the contrary, the fact that the appointment of Protecting 
Powers is drafted as mandatory implies that the belligerents’ interests are not the only 
relevant interests, but also that other states are concerned with respect for IHL. Moreover, 
Article 5(6) API distinguishes the activity of the Protecting Powers regarding IHL 
implementation from that concerned with diplomatic assistance. In the past, the so-called 
‘Geneva mandate’ (based on the 1949 Geneva Conventions) and ‘Vienna mandate’ 
(based on the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations) were performed together. The distinction between the 
two is reasonable because while the performance of diplomatic relations is primarily 
based on bilateral relationships, and thus it may be broken if every state considers it no 
longer satisfactory for its own interests, scrutinising IHL compliance concerns the legal 
interests of the international community as a whole. Accordingly, the two systems may 
follow different rules.57
56 See Jean Pictet (ed), Commentary: I Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War (ICRC 1958) 95; François Bugnion, ‘Article 8: Protecting Powers’ in ICRC (n 46) para 
1044.
57 See Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Protecting Powers’ in MPEPIL online (2009) para 21 (with an erroneous 
reference to Art 5(5) rather than Art 5(6) API).
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In light of the above, it seems that the system of Protecting Powers is a manifestation 
of shared interests of the international community, similar to those expressed in more 
general terms by common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.58 However, 
Protecting Powers have been appointed only on few occasions, and, today, one may 
wonder whether the obligation to appoint them is still a duty, or whether it has been 
transformed by custom into a power.59 However, the decision to adopt provisions 
regarding the duty to appoint Protecting Powers hints that IHL rules are obligations erga 
omnes / obligations erga omnes partes, notwithstanding the fact that states have failed to 
appoint Protecting Powers for political reasons.60 
In addition, it is noteworthy that Article 90 API introduced the International 
Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, a permanent body of individuals from different 
countries who, acting in a personal capacity, are tasked with inquiring into grave breaches 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and API, and offering their good offices to belligerents. 
Although this mechanism of compliance attracted some attention in the 1990s when it 
was first established,61 it has not made a significant contribution to IHL implementation 
since then, and it is considered a sort of ‘sleeping beauty’.62 Nonetheless, this mechanism 
is further evidence of a common interest in monitoring IHL implementation, especially 
since, pursuant to Article 90 API, there is nothing preventing states not directly affected 
by serious IHL violations from requesting the Commission’s intervention.63
58 See Benvenuti (n 46) 41; Frédéric Siordet, The Geneva Conventions of 1949: The Question of Scrutiny 
(ICRC 1953) 71; Henckaerts (n 46) paras 147 and 181.
59 For more on this, see Robert Kolb, ‘Protecting Powers’ in Clapham, Gaeta, Sassòli (n 46) 557-560.
60 See Giulio Bartolini, ‘Strengthening Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: The Failed 
Proposal for a “Meeting of States on International Humanitarian Law”’ (2015) 25 Italian YIL 202, 204-
205.
61 See eg Luigi Condorelli, ‘L’inchiesta e rispetto degli obblighi di diritto internazionale umanitario’ in 
Giorgio Badiali (ed), Scritti degli allievi in memoria di G Barile (Cedam 1995) 225, 252-288.
62 See Frits Kalshoven, ‘The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission: A Sleeping Beauty?’ 
(2002) 15 Humanitäres Völkerrecht 213. According to a recent study, the commission was involved in just 
one armed conflict in 1996 (Heike Spieker, ‘International (Humanitarian) Fact-Finding Commission’ in 
MPEPIL online (2015), para 33).
63 See Luigi Condorelli, ‘The Continuity between Certain Principles of Humanitarian Law and the Concept 
of Crimes of States’ in Weiler, Cassese, Spinedi (n 15) 233, 236; August Reinisch, ‘The International Fact-
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d. Special Rules regarding Derogations, Renunciations, Reprisals, and 
Suspension or Termination due to Material Breaches
There are other provisions that underscore the fact that contemporary IHL embodies 
obligations erga omnes / obligations erga omnes partes. 
First, according to common Article 6/6/6/7 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
Article 47 GCIV, no special agreement between the parties to a conflict may reduce the 
protection offered by the Conventions. These norms function similarly to Article 103 of 
the UN Charter, dictating the prevalence of the 1949 Geneva Conventions qua treaty law 
on subsequent agreements.64 On the basis of these provisions, a treaty in conflict with the 
1949 Geneva Conventions is not void as in cases of conflict with jus cogens,65 but rather, 
the subsequent treaty should be simply disregarded in favour of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. One could wonder why two sovereign states would be prevented from 
concluding new treaties derogating from previous ones pursuant to Article 30 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT); the only reasonable answer is that 
the interests protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions are the concerns of all the 
contracting states and, accordingly, they may not be disposed at the will of two states.
Second, according to common Article 7/7/7/8 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
persons protected ‘may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights 
secured to them’. Without entering the complex debate regarding whether this provision 
implies rights directly conferrable to individuals, suffice it to note that states may not 
Finding Commission According to Art 90 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and its Potential 
Enquiry Competence in the Yugoslav Conflict’ (1996) 65 Nordic JIL 241, 252-253.
64 See Robert Kolb, ‘Etude sur l’Occupation et sur l’Article 47 de la IVème Convention de Genève du 12 
Août 1949 Relative à la Protection des Personnes Civiles en Temps de Guerre: La Degré d’Intangibilité 
des Droits en Territoire Occupé’ [2002] African YIL 297; Lindsey Cameron, ‘Commentary to Article 6’ in 
ICRC (n 51).
65 Obviously, if the IHL provision in conflict with a subsequent agreement reflects jus cogens, then the 
agreement would be void as well.
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invoke the consent of the protected persons in order to justify violations of their rights.66 
As suggested, the meaning of this provision ‘lies in what it reveals of the substantive rules 
of behaviour enshrined in the Conventions.’67 It may be argued that the renunciation is 
not legally valid since the duty to respect IHL is owed to the international community as 
a whole, rather than towards a specific state or certain individuals.
Third, IHL prohibits reprisals — i.e. countermeasures in response to IHL violations 
— against protected persons and objects.68 This prohibition, reflecting customary 
international law,69 developed especially after the two World Wars, in which atrocities 
were committed against civilians and prisoners of war under the label of reprisals.70 
Again, this ban may be explained on the basis of the consideration that actions against 
protected persons and objects would not only violate the interests of a state which 
previously breached IHL — in order to make it comply with its obligations — but also 
the legal interests of every state in the international community.71 
Fourth, and related to the previous point, a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions may 
not invoke a material breach by another party in order to suspend or terminate the 
66 See François Buignon, The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Protection of War Victims 
(Macmillan 2003) 438.
67 Pierre D’Argent, ‘Non-Renunciation of the Rights Provided by the Conventions’ in Clapham, Gaeta, 
Sassòli (n 46) 145, 149.
68 See Art 46 I GC, Art 47 II GC, Art 13(3) III GC, Art 33(3) IV GC, Artt 20, 51(6), 52(1), 53(c), 54(4), 
55(2), and 56(4) API. See also Art 50(1)(c) DARS.
69 This is the opinion of the ICTY, Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreškić (n 53) para 531; Prosecutor v Milan 
Martić, IT-95-11-R61, 8 March 1996, para 10. Since some states still today consider that, under exceptional 
circumstances, civilians may be subject to reprisals in the course of hostilities (see Customary IHL (n 43), 
520-522), the ICRC considers that the ban on reprisals against protected persons is customary in character 
(ibid 519-520), while there is a strong trend towards the crystallisation of a customary ban on reprisals 
against civilians in the conduct of hostilities (ibid 523).
70 On this topic, see, generally, Frits Kalshoven, ‘Belligerent Reprisals Revisited’ [1990] 21 Netherlands 
YIL 43; Jérôme de Hemptinne, ‘Prohibition of Reprisals’ in Clapham, Gaeta, Sassòli (n 46) 575.
71 The Special rapporteur Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz proposed a general ban on countermeasures regarding 
obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes in ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility’ 
[1992-II] YILC paras 92-95. See also Serena Forlati, Diritto dei trattati e responsabilità internazionale 
(Giuffrè 2005) 114.
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application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions pursuant to Article 60 VCLT.72 In fact, 
Article 60(5) expressly excludes this rule’s applicability ‘to provisions relating to the 
protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in 
particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by 
such treaties.’ Article 60(5) was first proposed by the Swiss representatives at the UN 
Conference on the Law of Treaties, who mentioned the ban on reprisals embodied in the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the need to protect human beings as reflected in IHL and 
other branches of international law.73 It is clear that this provision, which is applicable 
also to human rights treaties, covers the 1949 Geneva Conventions and API, which are 
treaties that protect human beings, that are of a humanitarian character, and that ban 
reprisals against protected persons.74 Article 60(5) VCLT arguably addresses obligations 
erga omnes partes; a common interest among the contracting states one of the principal 
arguments explaining why treaties such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions may not be 
suspended or terminated in response to material breaches.75 
All of the above mechanisms are related to the erga omnes or erga omnes partes nature 
of IHL obligations rather than to their alleged peremptory nature. Indeed, common Article 
6/6/6/7 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 47 GCIV do not prescribe the 
invalidity of a treaty conflicting with IHL conventions — which would be the effect of a 
conflict with jus cogens. Similarly, the ban on belligerent reprisals and the inapplicability 
of the rule on material breach do not depend on the ascertainment of the peremptory 
nature of IHL provisions case-by-case. In particular, the inapplicability of the rule on 
material breach pertains to all provisions relating to the protection of the human persons 
72 The ILC itself notes the link between the ban of reprisals and Art 60(5) VCLT in DARS, Commentary 
to Art 50, para 8. For more on this, see Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, ‘The Relationship between Reprisals 
and Denunciation or Suspension of a Treaty’ (1993) 4 EJIL 341; Pauwelyn (n 10) 913-914.
73 See UN Conference on the Law of Treaties: Official Records vol I (New York 1969) 354-355.
74 See Bruno Simma, Christian J Tams, ‘Article 60 – Convention de 1969’ in Olivier Corten, Pierre Klein 
(eds), Les Conventions de Vienne sur le droit des traités: Commentaire article par article (Bruylant 2006) 
2131, 2157-2161; Thomas Gigerich, ‘Article 60’ in Oliver Dörr, Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2nd edn, Springer 2018) 1095, 1122. 
75 See Condorelli, Boisson De Chazournes, ‘Quelques’ (n 45) 21; Picone, ‘Obblighi reciproci’ (n 2) 34-35; 
Forlati (n 71) 141. 
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in IHL, even with regard to those API provisions which do not have customary status. 
The reason for such departures from the general law of treaties and the law of 
international responsibility seems to be rooted in the nature of the legal interests protected 
by IHL provisions.
e. The Prosecution of War Crimes
Although this is not the occasion to analyse fully the role of obligations erga omnes in 
international criminal law, a brief reflection is needed to demonstrate that IHL 
compliance through criminal prosecution concerns the international community as a 
whole.76
Contracting states have a duty to provide for effective criminal sanctions for persons 
responsible for grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and API, or to hand those 
persons over to another contracting state for trial.77 The drafters of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions aimed to repress grave breaches of IHL irrespective of a jurisdictional link 
between the alleged offences and the seat of adjudication. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that, according to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in case of extradiont it is sufficient 
that the requesting state has a prima facie case, and that the surrender complies with 
domestic legislation. Accordingly, the rule aut dedere aut judicare does not satisfy the 
interest of a state particularly concerned with the alleged crimes — as would be the case 
if the 1949 Geneva Conventions would have required a jurisdictional link for the 
surrender — but rather, it aims at the punishment of IHL violations per se, a task that may 
be performed by every contracting state — i.e. every state in the international community 
given the universal ratification of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
76 See, generally, Emanuele Cimiotta, ‘The Relevance of Erga Omnes Obligations in Prosecuting 
International Crimes’ (2016) 76 ZaöRV 661.
77 Artt 49-50 GCI, Artt 50-51 GCII, Artt 129-130 GCIII, Artt 146-147 GCIV, Art 85 API. On this topic, 
see, among others, Paola Gaeta, ‘Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions’ in Clapham, Gaeta, Sassòli 
(n 46) 615.
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That the rule aut dedere aut judicare regards legal interests of the international 
community as a whole or of a group of contracting states was also confirmed by the ICJ 
with reference to the corresponding provision embodied in the UN Convention against 
Torture,78 in a dispute that was kindled by a Belgian court’s decision to prosecute Hisséne 
Habré for international crimes, including war crimes.79 This conclusion was also 
somewhat acknowledged — albeit very timidly — by the ILC in a recent study on the 
obligation aut dedere aut judicare.80
In addition, the entire doctrine of the principle of universal jurisdiction regarding 
international crimes, including war crimes,81 may be read as implying that the state that 
commences a trial has an interest in the prosecution of those criminal acts, even in the 
absence of a traditional jurisdictional link. This interest might derive from the fact that 
the breached norms are obligations erga omnes / obligations erga omnes partes,82 even if 
states with legislation regarding universal jurisdiction have not openly invoked these 
kinds of obligations to justify the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction.83 
78 See Belgium v Senegal (n 36) paras 68-70, in which the ICJ based the Belgian locus standi on the fact 
that the Convention against Torture embodies obligations erga omnes partes. For more on the relationship 
between obligations erga omnes partes and the principle aut dedere aut judicare in this decision, see 
Emanuele Cimiotta, ‘Aut dedere aut judicare, universalità “condizionata” e Convenzione contro la tortura: 
a margine del caso Belgio c Senegal’ (2013) 7 Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 105. 
79 See Belgium v Senegal (n 36) paras 19, 21, 54.
80 See ‘Final Report on The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (Aut Dedere Aut Judicare)’ (2014) 
<legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/reports/7_6_2014.pdf>. 
81 On universal jurisdiction and grave breaches of IHL, also for references to the relevant case law and 
domestic legislation, see Roger O’Keefe, ‘The Grave Breaches Regime and Universal Jurisdiction’ (2009) 
7 JICJ 811.
82 See eg Rosanne van Alebeek, ‘The Pinochet Case: International Human Rights Law on Trial’ [2000] 71 
BYIL 29, 34; Harmen van der Wilt, ‘Universal Jurisdiction under Attack. An Assessment of African 
Misgivings towards International Criminal Justice as Administered by Western States’ (2011) 9 JICJ 1043, 
1050-1051; Sienho Yee, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Concept, Logic, and Reality’ (2011) 10 Chinese JIL 503, 
505.
83 See Tams, ‘Enforcing’ (n 2) 10. 
21
IV. The Convergence of Secondary Norms on IHL Violations and the Law of 
State Responsibility regarding Serious Violations of Obligations Erga 
Omnes and Obligations Erga Omnes Partes
This section argues that the the rules on serious violations embodied in IHL conventions 
and the relevant state practice is consistent with the rules on state responsibility 
concerning the consequences of violations of obligations erga omnes / obligations erga 
omnes partes, so that the two systems appear to have converged to similar solutions.   
As mentioned above, indirectly affected states may invoke the responsibility of 
another state, claim cessation of the wrongful act, claim assurances of non-repetition, and 
claim performance of the obligation of reparation on behalf of the directly injured state 
or the beneficiaries of the obligation violated. Moreover, they shall not recognise the 
consequences of serious violations of obligations erga omnes. Finally, peaceful 
countermeasures may be undertaken, although there is no general consensus regarding 
forcible countermeasures.84 
State practice regarding serious IHL violations is ripe with reactions of indirectly 
affected states. Limiting this analysis to the most recent state practice, it is possible to 
find several individual condemnations and requests for cessation from indirectly affected 
states, e.g. in the cases of the Iran-Iraq conflict,85 the Rwandan genocide,86 the war in 
Bosnia,87 the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo,88 the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,89 the Libyan 
84 See above Section II for a discussion on these issues.
85 Spain, ‘Comunicado del Gobierno expresando su preocupacíon por el conflicto bélico entre Irán e Irak’ 
(15 March 1988) quoted in Customary IHL (n 43) vol II 41.
86 See, e.g., France, ‘Communiqué of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Rwanda’ (17 July 1994) 
quoted in Customary IHL (n 43) vol II 37.    
87 See, e.g., the 1993 Franco-German Declaration on the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina quoted in 
Customary IHL (n 43) vol II 24; Netherlands, ‘Letters from the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ (11 February 
1994 and 27 July 1995) quoted in Customary IHL (n 43) vol II 40.
88 France, ‘Reply by Pierre Moscovici, Ministre Délegué for European Affairs, to a question in parliament’ 
(19 January 1999) quoted in Customary IHL (n 43) vol II 37.
89 See, e.g., ‘Address to the UN General Assembly by President George HW Bush’ (1 October 1990) 
<www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207268.htm>; ‘League of the Arab States, Res/5038/ES (31 August 1990)’ 
in Elihu Lauterpacht et al (eds), The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents (Grotius 1991) 296.
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civil war,90 the Syrian civil war,91 and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.92 Similarly, 
one may take into proper consideration states’ votes approving General Assembly’s and 
Security Council’s resolutions condemning IHL violations as manifestations of states’ 
opinio juris.93 
Scholars have suggested that indirectly affected states may adopt countermeasures in 
response to serious IHL violations since the codification of modern jus in bello.94 The 
practice regarding countermeasures adopted by indirectly affected states when IHL is 
seriously violated is quite scarce, but it does exists. Recent practice regards the 2011 
Libyan civil war, when, prior to the adoption of UN sanctions, Switzerland and the US 
froze the assets of both Gaddafi and the Libyan Central Bank, while the Arab League 
suspended Libya’s membership even in the absence of justification under its Charter.95 
Similarly, during the Syrian civil war, the EU, the Arab League, and some non-EU 
90 See, e.g., Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya’ (28 March 2011) 
<www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>.
91 See the position of Germany, Kuwait, Norway, and UK in ‘Co-Hosts Declaration of the Supporting Syria 
and The Region Conference, London 2016’ (4 February 2016) 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/498040/Supporting_Syria__the_
Region_London_2016_-_Co-hosts_Declaration__penultimate_.pdf>.
92 See, e.g., the reaction to the 2014 Gaza War of Belgium, ‘Didier Reynders Calls for a Ceasefire Between 
Gaza and Israel’ (15 July 2014) 
<countries.diplomatie.belgium.be/en/nigeria/newsroom/news.jsp?id=252669>; Brazil, ‘Conflict between 
Israel and Palestine’ <www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/ficha-pais/42-diplomacia-publica/notas-a-
imprensas/5714-conflict-between-israel-and-palestine>. 
93 For the UN bodies condemnations of IHL violations, see eg SC Res 540, UN Doc S/RES/540, 31 October 
1983; SC Res 876, UN Doc S/RES/876, 19 October 1993; SC Res 1973, UN Doc S/RES/1973, 17 March 
2011; UN GA Res 60/105, UN Doc A/RES/60/105, 8 December 2005 (which has been repeated almost 
identically every year, the last in UN GA Res 70/88, A/RES/70/88, 15 December 2015).
94 See, eg, Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, a Treatise, vol I (2nd edn, Longman 1912) 191.
95 See Swiss Federal Council, ‘Ordonnance instituant des mesures à l’encontre de certaines personnes 
originaires de la Libye’ (21 February 2011) <www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-
compilation/20110418/201103110000/946.231.149.82.pdf>; President Obama’s Executive Order 13566 of 
25 February 2011 <www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/2011_libya_eo.pdf>; ‘Arab League Bars Libya From Meetings, 
Citing Forces’ Crimes’, Bloomberg News (22 February 2011) <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-
02-22/arab-league-bars-libya-from-meetings-citing-forces-crimes>.
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countries adopted sanctions against Syria.96 All these measures appear to be illegal under 
the statutes of the relevant organisations,97 international trade and investment law, and 
the principle of non-intervention.98 It has been suggested that these actions are 
countermeasures in response to serious IHL violations pursuant to Articles 48 and 54 
DARS.99
Moreover, some states have declared that the 1949 Geneva Conventions impose the 
responsibility to ‘take steps to ensure the respect of these humanitarian rules in all 
circumstances by other States, even if they are not themselves directly involved in an 
armed conflict’.100 A similar opinio juris was also manifested by states in a questionnaire 
prepared by the ICRC,101 and by General Assembly’s and Security Council’s 
resolutions.102 Finally, after having affirmed in the Wall advisory opinion that Israel had 
violated certain obligations erga omnes, the ICJ added that ‘all the States parties to 
[GCIV] [...] are under an obligation, while respecting the [UN] Charter and international 
96 See eg Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 [2011] OJ L 121/11; Council Decision 
2011/782/CFSP of 1 December 2011 [2011] OJ L 319/56; ‘Isolating Syria, Arab Leagues Approves 
Imposes Broad Sanctions’, The New York Times (27 November 2011) 
<www.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/world/middleeast/arab-league-prepares-to-vote-on-syrian-
sanctions.html?_r=0>; President Obama’s Executive Orders 13573 (18 May 2011) and 13582 (17 August 
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law, to ensure compliance by Israel with IHL as embodied in that Convention’,103 but it 
is doubtful whether this sentence refers to countermeasures.104 
With regard to the minority view according to which the use of force as a 
countermeasure may be lawful under certain conditions, suffice it to say that serious IHL 
violations are mentioned as breaches that might allow such reactions,105 even in the 
context of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect.106 Even the 2017 and 2018 US, 
UK, and French bombings against a Syrian air force base and some industrial compounds 
may be considered as third states’ countermeasures in response to serious violation of 
IHL obligations erga omnes, even if these attacks are clearly unlawful.107
As to the duty to cooperate to bring to an end to certain serious violations pursuant to 
Article 41 DARS, which, as already mentioned, should be read as referring to obligations 
erga omnes as well,108 it should be noted that Article 89 API clearly states that ‘[i]n 
situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High 
Contracting Parties undertake to act jointly or individually, in co-operation with the [UN] 
and in conformity with the [UN] Charter.’ Even if the text of Article 41 DARS does not 
refer directly to the UN, it is generally accepted that in cases of serious violations of 
obligations erga omnes an institutional reaction by an international organisation or a body 
that represents the interests of the international community as a whole or the contracting 
103 Wall opinion (n 29), para 159.
104 See Section V.
105 See eg Picone ‘Unilateralismo’ (n 24) 26.
106 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
December 2001, <responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf> para 4.20. On the relationship 
between common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Responsibility to Protect, see Laurence 
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states would be more advisable.109 In this respect, the Security Council is considered the 
most appropriate institutional actor to coordinate these reactions.110 Article 89 API 
conveys this idea in the field of IHL,111 even if IHL implementation originally was outside 
the scope of the Security Council’s action.112 Moreover, according to a commentator, the 
UN ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia may 
be seen as the reaction of the international community, acting through the Security 
Council, against serious IHL violations committed in those countries.113 Similarly, it has 
been argued that Security Council referrals in the ICC Statute may be considered 
expressions of a similar reaction against violations of obligations erga omnes, including 
war crimes.114 Furthermore, another institutional actor for cooperation in response to 
serious IHL violations may be seen in the Conference of the High Contracting Parties to 
GCIV held in Geneva on 5 December 2001 pursuant to common Article 1 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.115 
109 The coordination of the UN in these cases has been foreseen by Ago in ‘Eighth Report on State 
Responsibility’ [1979-II] ILCY 43-44. The Special rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz attempted to link the 
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V. Conclusions
In light of the above, it is reasonable to argue that IHL should be seen as an ‘atelier 
d’expérimentation juridique’116 regarding the law of state responsibility applicable to 
obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes. Not only, it has been argued, 
does IHL embody obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes, but also 
state practice and treaty law provide secondary rules on serious IHL violations that are 
very similar to those subsequently codified by the ILC. Admittedly, it is difficult to prove 
that these IHL provisions were directly employed as a model for the development of the 
law of state responsibility on serious violations of obligations erga omnes and obligations 
erga omnes partes; however, this conclusion is suggested by the similarities between 
practice in response to violations of IHL and the secondary rules arising in response to 
violations of obligations erga omnes codified by the ILC. The influence of IHL on the 
law of state responsibility here can be viewed alongside other regimes, such as that 
embodied in the Genocide Convention. As one commentator has noted, there is a 
continuity between IHL and general international law in relation to the consequences of 
serious violations.117
116 This expression is borrowed from Luigi Condorelli, ‘Le droit international humanitaire en tant qu’atelier 
d’expérimentation juridique’ in Walter Haller et al (ed), Im Dienst an der Gemeinschaft. Festschrift für 
Dietrich Schindler, zum 65. Geburtstag (Helbing & Lichtenhahn 1989) 193.
117 See Condorelli, ‘The Continuity’ (n 63).
